The objective of this paper will be to demonstrate the existence and force of the notwithstanding taboo, a barrier to its invocation that stems from a combination of normative opposition to violating Canadians' rights and political-electoral interests. First, I construct the notion of taboo as functionally distinct from a convention or a norm, which renders the idea of utilizing the notwithstanding clause to the margins of their legislative strategy. Any invocation of s.33 would both violate the principle of respecting Charter rights and would cause political backlash that could significantly affect the governing party's electoral fortunes. Second, I
examine the evolution of this taboo surrounding the override clause, from its initial inception in John Diefenbaker's Bill of Rights, which entered into force in 1960, through its modification and expansion in the Charter of Rights up to the present in order to determine the extent to which its demonization will restrict its usage in the future. It must be recalled that using the override clause now would break a pattern of 25 years of non-usage and holding the Charter of Rights sacrosanct at the federal level, which supports the argument that suggests that as time goes on and the continued practice of non-use endures, the likelihood of it being used continually decreases. 5 The previous rights regime in Canada, governed by the Bill of Rights, endured for a decade before being temporarily suspended by Trudeau during the FLQ crisis and subsequently enduring a restriction on the freedom of association clause. For a rights regime that only enjoyed statutory status, this in itself is commendable and demonstrative of the strong tradition in Canadian government to follow the principles of the rule of law and responsible government.
With the Charter of Rights entrenched in the Constitution, it holds even higher status in the minds of Canadians. Third, the paper examines a number of "near-miss" cases in which
Canada's prime ministers in the Charter era encountered situations in which using the notwithstanding clause was broached as a policy avenue to resolve policy problems. Brian
Mulroney, Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin, and Stephen Harper have all had encounters with s.33, and all of them ultimately rejected its usage, either out of principle or political pragmatism.
Finally, with the one aforementioned exception, the federal government has unfailingly defended and upheld the rights of Canadians for almost half a century. Is this reason to believe that the trend will continue? This question will be evaluated in the face of potential challenges to the taboo.
I: What Is a Taboo?
In liberal democracies today there are only a small number of actions or policies that are considered "off-limits" for politicians and heads of government. They are generally affiliated with conducting foreign policy. The most prominent taboo in international relations involves using weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, as a legitimate instrument of warfare. The emphasis on "the bomb" does not suggest that utilizing chemical or biological weapons is less repugnant or deserving of less opprobrium by the "international community" in the event of their usage. What makes nuclear weapons stand out as a separate entity altogether is their sheer destructiveness and ability to instantly destroy thousands of lives and devastate the collective psychology of a state's civilian population. It is for that reason a "normative prohibition on nuclear use has developed in the global system, which, although not (yet) a fully robust norm, has stigmatized nuclear weapons as unacceptable weapons of mass destruction." 6 That factor, like other highly credible theories of deterrence and mutually assured destruction, plays a central role in considerations for avoiding the usage of weapons that could end a war within minutes. In the forum of public opinion, domestic and global, "nuke 'em," though a popular Hollywood film solution, is unacceptable as a legitimate policy option, all the more so for democratically accountable governments.
Nuclear weapons and Canada's notwithstanding clause are not moral equivalents. Yet the past quarter-century, and indeed the past half-century if we acknowledge the override clause contained in the original Bill of Rights, has demonstrated that the invocation of s.33 would represent a political atomic bomb being dropped on the rights of Canadians. 7 Peter Hogg, Canada's foremost constitutional expert, predicted in 1982 that "the exercise of the [override] power would normally attract such political opposition that it would be rarely invoked; but the means of escape from the Charter is there without the necessity of a constitutional amendment." 8 To one Charter analyst, that very fact "is an invitation to its use," suggesting that "Parliament and the legislatures might be prone to accept this invitation." 9 Yet Parliament has not used its overriding power, and the legislatures have not done so with much enthusiasm as might have been expected by those who had predicted a "checkerboard" of rights in Canada.
In order to achieve the level of "taboo," as opposed to convention (i.e. disallowance) or even a norm (i.e. a government adhering the will of Parliament and resigning after losing a vote of confidence), there are many factors which must come into coalition. Taboos are a certain, elevated, type of norm, which can be defined as a "shared expectation of behaviour, a standard of right and wrong," 10 but they go further than norms in the extent to which they provoke opposition from both the public and its policy practitioners. Rather than being simply decisions or actions that political leaders do not undertake, taboos are policy choices they absolutely
should not undertake because they are seen to lack legitimacy.
What are the criteria that raise norms to taboos? First, there must be a strong opposition from the public to a certain policy. This is a voice which must be expressed in unqualified terms.
It is not enough for the populace to express potential dissatisfaction regarding a policy outcome;
citizens must reject the outcome as being illegitimate and express that pursuing that outcome will have dire consequences. This public reaction must profoundly affect the decision-making choices pursued by policy-makers, who will, if the public's discourse on a notwithstanding taboo is sufficiently compelling, pursue what can be labeled "dilemmas of common aversion," which "exist when all actors share a concern to avoid a particular outcome." 11 In the example of the emerging notwithstanding taboo, no political party, particularly at the federal level where the taboo is strongest, actively desires to use the notwithstanding clause because they believe that it will have major ramifications for their electoral hopes. There is an emerging consensus between both governing and governed regarding its usage: citizens largely oppose using the notwithstanding clause for any reason, and the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition are both on record stating that they would not use the override. 12 Beyond the political-electoral concerns, many prominent Canadian politicians have major reservations about limiting rights for any reason, no matter how "politically popular" or "justifiable" such an action may seem at the time. The idea that "rights are rights are rights" is a lofty standard held by many Canadians, and any infringement upon Charter rights would be viewed as a dangerous outcome because of potential future implications. 19 This paper will return to the debate in its discussion of future challenges to the notwithstanding taboo, but it is easy to see the effect this issue has already had, causing both proponents and opponents to demand the government invoke s.33 to protect rights, religious or equality, from being infringed by Bill C-38.
The ultimate guarantor of the notwithstanding taboo is the trust and faith that Canadians place in their government to not abridge their rights. Thus far, they have earned that trust, and I concur with the assessment that "until the notwithstanding clause is abused 'by some thwarting of the legitimate aspirations of a truly dispossessed or marginalized group in our society,'"
Canada's leaders do deserve the benefit of the doubt that they will uphold the notwithstanding taboo. 20 Following the 2006 election campaign, during which the Martin Liberals often charged that the Conservatives would limit Charter rights via the notwithstanding clause, Stephen Harper spoke of the trust which the voters had placed in his party and in his pledge to avoid the use of s.33 to overturn same-sex marriage rights. 21 Harper has thus come to understand the power of the notwithstanding taboo. The situation he faces as Prime Minister is different than that as Leader of the Opposition. When in government, policy-makers have greater authority and means to enact legislation; the message Harper received from the voters during the campaign was that rights are not to be bandied about as bartering tools. He now has a dilemma of aversion, and his past statements regarding the use of the notwithstanding clause may come into play in a future election regardless of his conduct in his first term. Court ruled to enforce a provision of the Bill of Rights against a section of the Indian Act. The equality rights of Aboriginals-as-Canadians were upheld in opposition of the Indian Act's provision that it is a crime for Aboriginals to be intoxicated "anywhere off a reserve." 26 Because it is not illegal for non-Aboriginal Canadians to be intoxicated in most areas, the Indian Act was thus found to be discriminatory and the Court ruled appropriately. As such, the casual dismissal of the Bill of Rights today is inconsistent with its legal achievements affirming Canadians' rights.
II: The Bill of Rights
At the political level, the Bill of Rights was also accorded a measure of respect and deference. For the course of its existence politicians dared not suggest weakening or repealing its provisions else they be attached to the label of disregarding the rights of Canadians.
Diefenbaker's Conservatives, the same party that introduced Canada's "New Deal" legislation during the Great Depression, highlight the unique character of Canadian conservatism, which expresses "an element of 'tory democracy'-the paternalistic concern for the condition of the people." 27 This is distinct from American conservatism, which desires to preserve the bourgeois liberal traditions such as individual liberty and democratic capitalism; whereas the American "Republican is always a liberal," a Canadian Conservative "may be at one moment a liberal, at the next moment a tory, and is usually something of both." 28 October 1970 indicates his reluctance in suspending rights even in the wake of a genuine national security threat:
These are strong powers and I find them as distasteful as I am sure you do. They are necessary, however, to permit the policy to deal with persons who advocate or promote the violent overthrow of our democratic system. In short, I assure you that the Government recognizes its grave responsibilities in interfering in certain cases with civil liberties, and that it remains answerable to the people of Canada for its actions. The government will revoke this proclamation as soon as possible. a. is or professes to be a member of the unlawful association; b. acts or professes to act as an officer of the unlawful association to be "guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment. 33 The Act made explicit reference, in s.12, to its operation notwithstanding the Bill of Rights. The "freedom of association" clause was thus limited for the six-month duration of the Act's operation, marking the only occasion that Canada's federal government has deviated from the normative principle of non-usage of a notwithstanding clause.
An outcome of the usage of the notwithstanding clause in this instance does deserve mention for potential future cases under the current Charter regime. In a time of national security, Canadians' rights were restricted and "no civil liberties arguments were raised… [and] civil libertarians, and defence lawyers amongst them, had 'estopped' [sic] themselves from raising these issues." 34 The implications for rights in the event of a terrorist attack or other national security emergency could be severe, and it will fall upon Canadians to enforce the notwithstanding taboo to prevent the government from engaging in "lesser evil" tactics such as those undertaken by Trudeau in the name of security. From an electoral standpoint, a government that takes rights away from citizens risks jeopardizing its future success. Rights and liberties are essential tenets in liberal democracies such as Canada, and governments seeking to act, even in times of crisis, are playing with fire when they broach the subject of curtailing rights as a "lesser evil" in the face of a national security emergency. As Michael Ignatieff correctly states, "A government seeking to respond to an attack or an expected danger is required to present the case for extraordinary measures to a legislature, to argue for them with reasons that might convince a reasonable person, and to alter the measures in the face of criticism." 37 The government will then be answerable for such measures at the time of the next election, and questions will arise whether suspending or overriding rights was justified.
IV: The Notwithstanding Taboo in the Charter Era
The Charter era of rights in Canada is now in its twenty-fifth year; it is a testament to the power of the notwithstanding taboo that "seven of the ten provinces and two of the three territories have never used the power of override; nor has the federal Parliament." 38 As the following discussion The strongest evidence in support of the existence of a normative basis for the non-use of the notwithstanding clause is the fact that it has never been utilized by the federal government.
Moreover, there exists only scant evidence that Ottawa has ever even considered using the override power to limit or restrict Charter freedoms. Because the federal government is perceived to be a unifying actor responsible for the ominous task of shaping "public demands and expectations" and respecting all Canadians as "individuals endowed with common rights," 43 it sets the national standard by which, it is hoped, all other governments will behave regarding Appeals' ruling that the ban was justified on the grounds of "reasonable limits" in ensuring public safety. 44 Had Martin won re-election, the idea of using s.33 would have been off the table for a federal ban on wearing the kirpan in public places such as schools. 45 In her statement representing the majority opinion, Justice Charron wrote:
A total prohibition against wearing a kirpan to school undermines the value of this religious symbol and sends students the message that some religious practices do not merit the same protection as others…It is incumbent on the schools to discharge their obligations to instill in their students this value that is at the very foundation of our democracy. 46 As such, the Harper government avoided action-indeed, even comment-on this issue to redress parental concerns that some students at school are carrying what can be considered a weapon, aware it would have to use the override to curtail a religious freedom. 47 For a government that in opposition fought in the name of religious freedoms against same-sex marriage, this would have been a decidedly awkward situation. In none of those legislative efforts, including the most restrictive of the proposed billsBill C-43, which would have sentenced "doctors to two years in jail for performing abortions where a woman's health is not at risk" 51 -could I discover any mention by the government of using s.33, though external pressures abounded. Mulroney did not want to risk legitimizing the override clause by invoking it on the abortion issue, and his leadership stands as the most profound period of normative opposition to the override.
Despite the mega-constitutional and national unity issues that were a hallmark of the first two of Chrétien's three majority terms, the only occasion in which the notion of using the override power occurred in the case of RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (1995) . The Supreme Court struck down legislation banning tobacco advertising, ruling that the tobacco companies' freedom of expression rights were unconstitutionally restricted. 52 The Court's opinion was that the ban deprived both Big Tobacco and the consumer of disseminating and receiving information relating to the health risks and other considerations in tobacco usage. 53 This was a case in which the public may have supported government action to limit the rights of a corporation that is responsible for numerous health risks and terminal diseases, yet Chrétien astutely chose to avoid the fray. Public opinion had turned solidly against the tobacco companies; as one advertising executive stated, "They'd [tobacco companies] have to be brain dead to thumb their noses at public opinion and the government." 54 As it stands, the only advocate in Parliament this writer could find in support of using the override in this case was the NDP's Ed Broadbent and other members of that party. 55 As the Chrétien years wore on into the new century, the movement towards legalizing same-sex marriage gained considerable momentum. In preventing the opposition parties from passing a bill that required the government to take "all necessary steps" to protect the traditional definition of marriage, Chrétien re-framed the debate into a referendum on the notwithstanding clause. His success in doing so, and in defeating the opposition bill, was seen as "indicative of a growing convention" that s.33 should never be used by any government. 56 He viewed the Charter as a living and active document and did not want to preclude sexual orientation from any dialogue between Parliament and the Supreme Court, stating that it was an "open-ended" debate and for "the court to decide" whether sexual orientation should fall under s.15 of the Charter. 57 Chrétien demonstrated that he had no intention of using s.33 in the same-sex marriage debate; his normative opposition to the notwithstanding clause was based on his belief that there should be dialogue between the legislative and judicial branches. 58 By the 2000 election campaign,
Chrétien had turned entirely against the override clause that he had once given a small vestige of support for including in the Charter. Referring to s.33 as "a nice way to destroy the Charter of Rights," and expressing his pride that no federal government used the override, 59 Chrétien laid the groundwork for the permanent opposition to the use of the override by the Liberals. Though his successor did broach the subject, advocacy of invoking the override has largely emanated from Conservatives, something which Liberals will pinpoint as emblematic of a "hidden agenda"
of their electoral opponents.
Though he had signaled support for legalization of same-sex marriage, Chrétien was unable to pass a bill before leaving office and being succeeded by Paul Martin. This story is interwoven with that of Stephen Harper's attitude towards the notwithstanding clause, and thus both will be discussed here. During the course of the debate, both proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage broached the idea of the necessity to invoke the notwithstanding clause.
Martin engaged both sides of the debate; it will be recalled that he had suggested using the override to affirm religious freedoms on the matter. In the end, he rejected both camps' overtures and avoided the use of s.33 to either affirm religious freedoms or override equality rights. Now that same-sex marriage has been legalized, it is "highly unlikely you're going to be able to reinstitute the opposite-sex definition of marriage without using the notwithstanding clause." 60 Paul Martin's opposition to the notwithstanding clause did not appear to be based on the same normative attitude held by his predecessor, given his musing about using it during the debate. Political considerations played a larger part in his decision-making than the notwithstanding taboo, making him a unique case in this study. His idea of legislating s.33 out of Parliament was hastily concocted, and reportedly Martin never brought it up with the constitutional scholars in his Cabinet. 61 During the election campaign, Harper pledged to not use the override to overturn C-38, a break from past stances, indicating that the political ramifications of the notwithstanding taboo have impacted his decision-making process. Thus there has been a convergence between ideals and political pragmatism among Canada's leaders which has made the use of the notwithstanding clause a taboo topic in contemporary Canadian political discourse.
Conclusions: The Future of the Notwithstanding Clause
When examining the historical record involving the federal government's non-use of the notwithstanding clause it is tempting to agree with Monahan's contention that s.33 is "obsolete"
in English Canada. Given that it has now been over fifteen years since Quebec last invoked the override, one could argue that it has now become a taboo in that province as well. There are profound arguments to be made against using the override either preemptively or in reaction vis-à-vis rulings from the judicial branch. Regarding preemption, Hiebert provides the best argument:
The override should not be used pre-emptively, to preclude judicial review, because this would circumvent conversation and deny the polity of the benefits of hearing the judiciary's concerns about the effects of the legislation for protected rights. 62 On reaction, refer to Cotler's statement that to use the notwithstanding clause is to acknowledge that the government is violating rights of Canadians. 63 Regardless of when, the invocation of s.33
by any government has substantial political consequences that will more than likely have negative effects on that government's hopes for re-election.
But does this truly indicate that s.33 is a dead letter in Canadian politics? National security and public safety have trumped rights in the past, and the potential for a repeat of history certainly exists. Bill C-36, Canada's counterterrorism legislation passed after 9/11, may yet clash with rights and freedoms. The enhancement of policy authority has a historical parallel in the War Measures Act, and concerns have arisen that judicial control over "search-and-seizure, arrest, and surveillance powers," all of which fall under the Charter umbrella in ss.7-14, may be insufficient to prevent abuses. 64 Tolerance and respect are at the heart of minority group rights, but often the majority, in conceding equality rights, does not give its approval and limits its expression to a "merely reluctant tolerance" of minority groups. 65 As more and more groups demand the "unconditional surrender" of the majority to give their approval in granting rights, 66 there will occasionally arise a backlash among the majority. Some will argue that society is "not ready" to grant approval of particular minority interests-'swingers clubs' and polygamist groups readily come to mindand there will be considerable pressure on governments to act preemptively to forestall any possibility of these claims for rights gaining acceptability. These claims must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis for their applicability to either Charter rights or the Criminal Code, and those which fall under the former could be restricted via the notwithstanding clause. 67 It is difficult to predict a government's response to such hypothetical scenarios; a Conservative government would face immense pressure from its electoral base of support to use any means necessary to indefinitely ban polygamy. If it chose to use s.33, however, the Tories would arouse considerable outrage from those who view any use of the override as illegitimate, even if to outlaw practices that a majority of the population deems immoral.
The ultimate question thus remains: does a notwithstanding taboo exist and will it continue to deter governments from using s. 33 Thus, I respond to the above question in the affirmative. Norms "do not determine outcomes" and are confined to influencing "the probability of occurrence of certain courses of action." 69 Yet to deny that there is an obstacle beyond realist electoral considerations seems inappropriate and overlooks the normative statements by leaders such as Mulroney and Trudeau, and academics such as Mandel (who, it will be recalled, described s.33 as "evil"). It is exceedingly difficult to predict the future in political science, but given elected officials' reluctance to wade into the murky waters of the notwithstanding debate and 25 years of historical non-use weighing on their minds as a political barrier, some measure of certainty can be exercised in stating that the state's ability to "pursue compelling legislation" to infringe rights 70 may yet become truly "obsolete" in the same fashion as the federal Parliament's power of disallowance.
Notes
